in a manner so close, bit-mapped, or microbial (to use some of the method's paradigms) that the critic appears no farther from the cultural object than a cybernetic or biological virus from its host at the moment of code exchange. We live in an age of "detailism" characterized by the "pervasive valorization of the minute, the partial, and the marginal," Naomi Schor says in her intriguing Reading in Detail, a study of the genealogy of detailism leading up to modernist and poststructuralist aesthetics.9 High cultural criticism is an aesthetics-and much more-of specifically postmodern detailism.10 Or to name the method's related leading concepts: it is particularism, localism, regionalism, relative autonomism, incommensurabilism, accidentalism (or contingency), anecdotalism, historicism, and-to draw attention to a set of curiously prominent Greek prefixes in the method-"micro-," "hetero-," and "poly-"ism. "All these," we may say in words borrowed from Clifford Geertz's Local Knowledge, "are products of a certain cast of thought, one rather entranced with the diversity of things."" Or as Richard Rorty sums it up, "All that can be done to explicate 'truth,' 'knowledge,' 'morality,' 'virtue' is to refer us back to the concrete details of the culture in which these terms grew up."12 And most succinctly, that unofficial motto repeated several times in Jerome McGann's Social Values and Poetic Acts: "I make for myself a picture of great detail."13 I will want to return to Schor's and McGann's books in particular because their emphases are eminently relevant for us here, but at present I borrow only McGann's recommendation of a non-narrative form suited to displaying detailism: the array or matrix.14 Here is a matrix of cultural-critical phrases rendered in all their (self-thematized) disconnection as if they were so many piles of Lyotardian phrases, snatches of Rortyian conversation, pastiches of New Historicist paradigms, or sound bites of Baudrillardian media. Media-oriented readers, indeed, may wish to view this matrix as if with remote control in hand-flitting from channel to channel and sentence fragment to fragment in a hallucinatory blur of strangely continuous discontinuity:15 derly woman in more detail" "rather than thinking diffusely about 'the people,' I am trying wherever possible to ask how printing affected more carefully defined milieus" "local context" "a salty, particularistic, resourceful layer of culture." Carlo Ginzburg: "reconstruct a fragment" "a narrow investigation on a solitary miller" "the anecdote" "a microcosm." Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie: "analysis that is not only general ... but also detailed" "particular detail" "regional evidence" "in its smallest detail." CHANNEL 3: NEW HISTORICISM16
(Renaissance studies) Stephen Greenblatt: "some fragment of a lost life" "my vision is necessarily more fragmentary" "particular and local pressures" "partial, fragmentary, conflictual." Richard Helgerson: "the experience of particular communities" "individual autonomy . . . communal autonomy ... national autonomy" "the land in all its most particular divisions." Leah S. Marcus: "particular cultural situations" "'local' reading" "localization" "radical varieties of regionalism" "a patchwork of local differences." Louis Adrian Montrose: "the cultural specificity, the social embedment, of all modes of writing" "the pressure and particularity of material interests" "relative autonomy of specific discourses." Steven Mullaney: "a detailed mise-en-scene of Brazilian culture" "richly detailed" "preternatural detail."
(Romantic studies) Jon P. Klancher: "a reader situated in a particular social space" "crowding of cultural fragments" "a rich array of socially individuated types." Marjorie Levinson: "disturbing particular" "very concretely situated" "the particular and particularly constrained" "deeply specific" "epochal specificity" "we are the effects of particular pasts." Alan Liu: "concrete, highly charged phenomena... phenomenal spots of history" "uncountable local variations" "the scandal of the particular and partisan."JeromeJ. McGann: "the concrete, the material, and the particular" "the local, the topical, the circumstantial" "the polymorphous and the heteroglot" "daily life in a particular community" "incommensurate detail" "elementary particulars" "heuristic isolates" "minute particulars" "grains of sand in which the world may be seen" "minute particulars of time, place, and circumstance." David Simpson: "particular details-the details of disposition and empirical contingency" "small details of everyday life" "we are inevitably committed to a careful and detailed examination of particulars" "minute particulars." CHANNEL 4: NEW PRAGMATISM Stanley Fish: "all aesthetics, then, are local and conventional" "context specific" "parochial perspective of some local or partisan point of view" "contingent practices of particular communities." Frank Lentricchia: "specific, detailed, everyday functioning" "real local effects" "beliefs . . . are born locally in crisis and have local consequences only" "a het-surable levels, the heterogeneous impulses" "isolated, disconnected, discontinuous material signifiers." Pierre Macherey: "the specificity of the literary work" "product of a specific labour" "a specific but undisguised . .. relation with history." CHANNEL 6: FRENCH POST-MARXISM/PRAGMATISM Jean Baudrillard: "bits" "little black boxes" "bodily cells, electronic cells, party cells, microbiological cells . . . the tiniest, indivisible element" "the play of molecules . . . the play of infinitesimal signifiers" "tiniest disjunctive unities" "the operationalism of the smallest detail." Pierre Bourdieu: "an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted, the habitus" "the discontinuous, patchy space of practical paths" "polythesis." Michel de Certeau: "a science of singularity" "microbelike operations" "a 'polytheism' of scattered practices" "encysted in particularity" "microbelike, singular and plural practices" "micro-stories."Jean-Francois Lyotard: "a pragmatics of language particles ... a heterogeneity of elements ... institutions in patches-local determinism" "'nodal points' of specific communication circuits, however tiny" "petit recit" "petites histoires." Michel Foucault: "a 'new micro-physics' of power" "a political economy of detail" "a multiple network of diverse forces" "particular, local, regional knowledge" "the 'specific' intellectual" "dispersed, heteromorphous, localised procedures of power" "a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case" "a specific type of discourse on sex ... appearing historically and in specific places." '7 This, we recognize, is the rhetoric of a method, a sheer virtuosity of detail. Of course, this is not the whole picture of great detail. Indeed, it may be appropriate to interject a rhetorical gesture of our own imitating a topos we will see throughout the discourses of particularity: inexpressibility or incompletion. A fuller study of detail would need to bolster its canon not only with more authors than I have been able to array here but with other disciplines (historicist film studies, for instance, where Philip Rosen's work on cinematic detail and film studio production is provocative).18 It would also need to consider at length the applied side of cultural criticism: the grounding of its rhetoric on variously thorough or haphazard projects of recovering specific contexts of detail. Methodological vocabulary alone tells us relatively little, for example, about the assumptions embedded in the genre, style, tense, quotation strategy, and even type size of New Historicism's paradigms, Geertz's cockfights, or Bourdieu's slices of anthropology. Finally, a fuller study would advert to the sometimes massive discourse of detailism in such modern or structuralist forebears of the postmodern scene as traditional American pragmatism, Fernand Braudel's historiography, Georg Lukacs on the "special," Theodor Adorno's "micrological" aesthetics, Mikhail Bakhtin's "heteroglossia," formalist "close reading," or Roland Barthes on the "reality effect."19 But all such gestures of incompletion, we know, end by crossing their fingers: let us say, then, that the matrix I have presented is sufficient to simulate the whole.
What we observe in the matrix is a revisionary idea of culture whose full sweep could be conveniently analyzed as a cultural empirics, pragmatics, and dialogics-in short, a whole methodology for thinking the cultural world. Or rather, "thinking" 80 REPRESENTATIONS should not put us too much in mind of an orderly discourse of knowledge based on a set of operations for transforming discrete perceptions into cognition. Detail is the very instrument of the antifoundational and anti-epistemological imperative in high cultural criticism: its contention is that there is no reason (other than fidelity to quaint notions of philosophy) why contexts of discretely perceived particulars should resolve into culture as a single, grounded, and knowable order. The empirics, pragmatics, and dialogics of high cultural criticism are finally methodologies as much against as of knowledge-a methodical antimethod.
But there is a danger in antimethod, of course. It is possible to discern in the all too often trenchant formulations of cultural criticism precisely an incipient method or meta-way (metalhodos) of alternative knowledge. This is the criticism of hidden foundationalism that has long haunted Marxist criticism, for example.
Or again, we can think of the polemical hard edges of other cultural criticisms: Geertz's antifunctionalism, New Historicism's antiformalism, or the anti-Annales movement in New Cultural History-all of which wear their dissent, perhaps, with too heightened a sense of the sanctity of their meta-way.20 As when we read through the sequence of Rorty's works, which have essentially one thing to say but are adept at repeating the gospel again and again with wider relevance, the method of antimethod can at times seem too dogmatic, too much of a piece. It overdoes Rorty's prescription for pragmatist philosophy: to improvise upon one of his favorite phrases, the picture of detail not only shows "how things, in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together" but perhaps hangs together all too much-like a history painting on a wall.2' The picture of great detail, as it were, threatens to become a great picture of detail.
How to discern in our matrix a "thought" or "idea" of culture, then, without being too knowing even in the way of antiknowing? The answer, I suggest, lies precisely under the sign of a very old antifoundationalism or sophistry: rhetoric. In reading our matrix and the methods it indexes, we should be aware that we are indeed reading-that we are dealing with rhetoric as the facsimile knowledge or pseudo-analytic whose distinctive method is its tendency to lose its way at decisive moments, to pose a logic of detail only then to thwart itself (in the essential de Manian reading) by interposing incommensurable logics.22 In particular, our matrix of phrases declares that the methodology of high cultural criticism is really an incoherence of three rhetorical "moments." For ease of reference, these may be called immanence, commitment, and detachment. It is immanence that speaks within cultural criticism's empirics of the Real; commitment within its pragmatics of variously oppositional or neoconservative "practice"; and detachment within its cool dialogics of improvised conversation or petits recits (the "culture rap," that is, thematized by authors as diverse as Rorty, Darnton, de Certeau, Lyotard). Each such rhetorical moment at the core of the method, I suggest, is not an integral discourse but the site of an instability or turning in rhetoric. After all, only inner
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Of course, our most recent avatar of rhetoricity certainly holds to its own metaway. But deconstructive method will serve as a salutary corrective to culturalcritical method so long as we persist in seeing rhetoric as mediational to the endthat is, as perpetually a media or means rather than end. Rhetoric will be our means of referring cultural-critical method to the ultimate antifoundationalism or endless end: history. History, or "elsewhereness" as I have called it elsewhere, is alienated foundation.23 It is what orders the thought and, within thought, rhetoric of cultural criticism into a characteristic sequence whose logical necessity is subordinated to the phantom necessity of contingency. What I mean here may be educed from the detectable tug of diachrony in high cultural-critical argument, the tendency in the method to marshal reasons and discourses in a certain order unpredictable from within the system. As "thought," to begin with, cultural criticism follows a logical order that is pseudosyllogistic. Consider as evidence, for instance, the strong drift in Geertz's cockfight essay from counting bets to meditating on aesthetics; or, again, witness the glide in Rorty's Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity toward a culminating discussion of literature.24 Paralleling such linear movements of exposition are culturalcritical works that establish an axiology according to which art is the highest, most privileged, or otherwise most special form. (Thus one of the distinctive features of McGann's Social Values and Poetic Acts is its strong advocacy of "poetry" as a unique discourse that "performs a critical function which is not found in other forms of discourse.")25 What such directional arguments indicate is that high cultural critics more often than not argue from the major premise of empirical reality, through minor premises of pragmatism (the idea of "specific" practice, indeed, is analogous in function to a minor premise in classical syllogism), to a conclusion in aesthetics, dialogics, or media studies. "In conclusion," we hear them say, "it is as if specific practices enacted in plays, novels, stories, jokes, anecdotes, and other representations of culture were reality."
The arbitrariness of such syllogism comes clear when we remember that cultural criticism (at least in theory) eschews any foundational major premise or conclusion and makes "reality," "practice," and "discourse" all equivalent minor premises. What is it that drives the system of thought in a particular direction? The answer is already whispered in the deflected logic of the figurative/aesthetic "as if" at the conclusion of the cultural-critical syllogism (as I ventriloquized it above: "It is as if specific practices enacted in plays, novels . . ."). Such deflection is the very signature of the fact that the arbitrary direction of the syllogism is controlled internally by an equally arbitrary sequence of rhetorical moments from immanence through commitment to aesthetic detachment. And controlling this discursive sequence in turn is the bottomless foundation that sponsors any arbi-trary sequence: a series of purely contingent, historical moments. Putting the case in overview: high cultural criticism is a system in which thought is subjected through the mediation of rhetoric to that ultimate disruption of thought, history of thought.26
We will need to grow more specific in identifying the historical moments that regulate the system of high cultural criticism. In terms of a general history of thought, however (no doubt too neat to serve as more than a scaffolding for research into the history of cultural criticism), it may be suggested that the interior trajectory of high cultural criticism is along a succession of intellectualhistorical moments from the premodern through the modern to the postmodern-from immanental empirics through an originally Deweyan, Marxist, or New Critical praxis to distantiated dialogics.27 The historically given logics of the Real, the Practical, and the Simulated-with their underlying rhetorics of immanence, commitment, and detachment-blur in fast forward or filmic dissolve, and the overall result is the Baudrillardian sense of simulated reality, of remote or tele-engagement, that I have called detached immanence.
The Romanticism of Detail
The present essay focuses on the "first" or opening rhetoric of high cultural criticism: immanence.28 Here we are closest to foundationalism. Like pitons driven by the climber into a mountain face, details in the rhetoric of immanence are points of attachment where we experience such hands-on knowledge of the gritty cultural mass that we seem to feel the very quiddity of culture, the Real.
We will have reason to climb mountains later, but perhaps first we should be empirical and look at atoms. The sense of immanental reality I indicate lies screened behind the scientistic logic of high cultural criticism: the Whole Sick Crew (to allude to Pynchon's technovisionary fiction) of "highly charged phenomena," "atoms," "molecules," "micro-physics," "micro-processes," "DNA molecules," "microbiological cells," "microbe-like operations," "small mutations," "little black boxes," and so forth (all phrases from our matrix). More generally, immanence is screened by a broadly empirical view of culture, and if scientific idiom will not serve, then equally technical-sounding terminology must be invented-"micro-stories," for instance, or "multiple intellectual configurations," "a specific field for the exercise of cat power," "heuristic isolates." And this is not even to mention the massive traces of scientism in the more anthropological, sociological, statistical, or structuralist cultural criticisms.
What such empirics projects is a view of cultural matter (economic, social, political, or ideological) so objective that materialism seems to obey the dynamics of literal matter. We can take as our explanatory paradigm the sometimes explicit we might reinforce that great pillar of materialism throughout cultural criticism: the "concrete." Phrases in our matrix such as "concretely situated," "the concrete, the material, and the particular," or "ordinary, retail, detailed, concrete" build a world that is exactly concrete: a cement aggregate of specific and determinate particularity. Such unit-detail atomism is ubiquitous, affecting even the most sophisticated interpreter whenever argument turns in the direction of empirical investigation. To come directly to the heart of the "matter," we need only foreground what our matrix of phrases has already enacted: the strangely overdetermined role of matrix forms throughout cultural criticism.30 Matrices are the method's great aggregates of atomistic detail. To read at any length in cultural criticism, after all, is often precisely to read at length-an effect consisting not so much in the actual number of pages as in the wet-cement quality of the reading experience. Cultural criticism dilates discourse through interpolated arrays of particulars, a sort of blason of the mundane or what Rorty (inspired by a Philip Larkin poem) calls "lading lists" of the world.31 Indeed, it is precisely the list form (or simple matrix of one axis) that is most pervasive. Here is a short list of lists:
Darnton: The Italian motifs remained recognizable enough for one to be able to classify the tale in the Aarne-Thompson scheme (it is tale type 2032). But everything else about the story-its frame, figures of speech, allusions, style, and general feel-had become intensely Zuni.32 Geertz: Actually, the typing of cocks, which is extremely elaborate (I have collected more than twenty classes, certainly not a complete list), is not based on color alone, but on a series of independent, interacting, dimensions, which include-besides color-size, bone thickness, plumage, and temperament. The science of the list may be stated: wholes are knowable only as aggregates in which the detail has no interior detail. Cultural-critical detail, that is, is as much a resistance to, as enactment of, the more radical detailism of fractal and chaos theory in postmodern science proper. It is clear that the particulars gathered by Darnton and Geertz, for example, have no visible interior detail-no more so than the "And, And moreover, And nevertheless" in Lyotard's great work of/about lists (what he terms phrases "linked" in disconnection by their "differends"). "Frame, figures of speech," "size, bone thickness," and, and, ... exist at that lower event horizon known to all empirical investigators of culture where evidentiary authority must at last rest upon sketchy, borrowed, or otherwise uncooked "facts" collected without linkage in a notebook.36 At that event horizon there is no substantive difference between traditional empiricists and such outre' "scientists" of culture as structural anthropologists or structural Marxists. "Structure" itself reduces to lists. However much Althusser's overall theory is structural, for example, it is evident that his "empirical list" cements rough-hewn institutions en bloc in an essentially aggregate social whole. Similarly, the few details he does offer about the internal practices of religious and educational institutions accrue in an essentially mechanistic manner. "Apparatus," we may say, is the bureaucratization of the Lockean aggregate. "Thus Schools and Churches use suitable methods of punishment, expulsion, selection, etc.," Althusser says at one point, checking off the particulars of superstructure on a lading list of undetailed details punctuated by an etc.37
And with this etc. we come to the heart of the matter: the strange interface where the science of the list reveals its rhetoricity and, indexed by rhetoricity, its historicity. Seen one way, after all, the science of lists depends on a convention of figuration rather than of induction: a syntagmatics or metonymics whose illusion is that wholes are polymers of parts. What makes such figuration visible is an interior instability where saying one thing-in this case, listing atoms-suddenly seems equivalent to saying something else. What else does high cultural criticism have to say in the very act of reciting lists as if syntagm were its only discourse?
It has a lot to say, namely "etc. Etc., I suggest, is a trope of inexpressibility that introduces within atomism a rhetoric-within-rhetoric. Besides metonymy, after all, there is also that variant, more expansive play on particulars: synecdoche. It is synecdoche that redeems the etc. from the wasteland of endless syntagm (which some cultural criticisms also call consumerism) by transforming incompletion into the figure of fulfillment: a symbolics or iconic metaphorics putting the part for the cultural whole.39 I refer to the implicit rhetorical turn heard in such phrases from our matrix as "some fragment of a lost life," "my vision is necessarily more fragmentary," or "the fragments, the incommensurable levels, the heterogeneous impulses." Such rhetoric clearly confesses incompletion, but, at last, also the unmistakable sign of synecdoche. Fragments, after all, are by definition not "particles" (which exist whether or not they join in a larger unit); they can only be parts-of-a-whole. A phrase such as some fragment of a lost life thus implies by its genitive construction that "lost life" is not really lost, that "some fragment" despite its discontinuity with the lost life-world can be discovered to be part "of" the lost world and thus to be big with wholeness. Not a scientific method in which limits of error bracket literal incompletenesses, then (or, more recently, in which incompletely known "butterfly effects" wander a local-chaos universe of patterned error), but the kind of etc. by which Everyman in his very partialness once figured the whole body politic or cosmos. The fragmentary atomism of cultural-critical detail harbors a huge error or trope: "microcosm" in the old sense.40
Or rather, the detail is big with a slightly more recent, if still premodern, rhetoric of microcosm-with the rhetoric of parts-become-wholes, indeed, that originally arose to combat Lockean systemics. Here I advance the historical complement to rhetorical analysis. The moment of immanence is "first" in cultural criticism, as I have said, not because it is a priori but because it initiates an embedded historical sequence of rhetorics. It would be possible, for example, to refer postmodern cultural criticism at this point to modernist aesthetics. The "ontological particularity" or "iconics" that John Crowe Ransom argued in notably scientistic style is apropos.41 Or to vary upon the other prescriptives of close reading: it is now culture that is ambiguous and paradoxical in its tense complexity of particularity, its texture of "local irrelevance." It is culture that should not mean, but-with all the ontological zing of the Real-be. Thus arises 86 REPRESENTATIONS our new concrete universal: the cultural rather than verbal icon. But instead of bringing us back to the regime of Eliotic fragments shored against ruin, I will here drink deeply from the source. Let me refer postmodern cultural criticism to the movement that modernist aesthetics itself-together with such parallels as Deweyan philosophy-so aggressively sublated: romanticism. Cultural criticism is "first" of all an allusion to the moment when the rhetoric of empiricism confronted the early regime of the fragment: an emerging romantic rhetoric.
Witness, therefore, the broad, deep, and explicit remembrance of high romanticism-both literary and philosophical-in high postmodern cultural criticism. Without exaggeration, it may be said that romanticism is the most common ancestor of the various cultural criticisms: more basic, more shared than such polemically charged and relatively recent parent figures as Marx, Nietzsche, Dewey, Braudel, or Malinowski. Romanticism, as it were, is the grandparent or grandmuse: a grand-matrix of thought that, precisely because it is more distanced from current struggles for and against Marx, Nietzsche, Dewey, etc., indulges the most uncritical statements. A first evidence consists in such unabashed allusions in our matrix as "minute particulars," "grains of sand in which the world may be seen," "minute particulars of time, place, and circumstance," and (in imitation of Wordsworth's spots of time) "phenomenal spots of history." But the evidence runs deeper than spot allusions. There is a whole subgenre in cultural criticism of sustained and egregiously adventitious uses of romanticismgorgeous insets of romantic consciousness so well wrought, so self-sustaining, that we wonder whether cultural criticism is at last something like Keats's Grecian Urn: a mere fretwork of culture (some "little town by river or sea shore ... emptied of
[its] folk") silhouetted against an ideal ground.
A prime example is the New Historicism, whose frequent dependence on assumptions of romanticism and nineteenth-century historicism I have discussed elsewhere. In its many invocations of Hegelian "dialectic" together with its master-servant or "containment/subversion" analytic of power, for instance, poststructural discourse, in particular the work now commonly known as L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Writing."44 My own book on Wordsworth, I am compelled to add, is a sustained project of detailism thatjumps implicitly (and at times explicitly) between the particulars of the French Revolution period and our postmodern sense of a "differential," fractured, refugee culture. Or again, there is David Simpson's Wordsworth' Historical Imagination, whose attack on totalizing theory in favor of minute "particularity" parallels Wordsworth's own culturallinguistic attack on "gaudiness and inane phraseology" in defense of the "language really used by men."45
Similarly, romanticism exerts an inordinate influence on the New Pragmatism. It is intriguing, for instance, to consider the infamous setpiece at the center of Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels's "Against Theory."46 When that Lucy poem ("A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal") washes up on the beach as if by natural process without "intention," we are certainly being instructed in the manner of the philosophical traditions succeeding original pragmatism: analytical philosophy and its strong revision, "ordinary language" philosophy. Compensating for a bluntly denotative style with loony, pure thought-experiment examples ("The universe has expanded to twice its original size this night," "Suppose that in a distant galaxy there is the twin of our earth," "1227 is a rhombus," "Caesar is a prime number," "Should unusual, brilliant patterns suddenly appear in the skyeven if they took the form of letters which seemed to compose a sentence .. ."), analytical and ordinary language philosophy formed New Pragmatism in its image.47 Plain, blunt, and trenchant to the point of exaggeration, New Pragmatist discourse also favors "pure" examples-paradigms so denotatively complex but connotatively insensitive that they resemble Rube Goldberg contraptions. "Suppose that you're walking along a beach and you come upon a curious sequence of squiggles in the sand," Knapp and Michaels begin, and then set up their contraption: "You step back a few paces and notice that they spell out the following words: 'A slumber did my spirit seal. .. ."48
But if we attend to the undertow of allusion, we will recognize that the contraption washes up on a berm of romanticism. Surely, after all, we are in the wake of Lyrical Ballads with its original "ordinary language."49 Surely (to allude to The Prelude) we stand by some glimmering lake where a boy halts his owl songs to feel with shock the "voice" and "imagery" of the landscape sinking "unawares into his mind."50 Or again, to invoke "The Sensitive-Plant," we pause by some Shelleyan ocean "whose waves never mark, though they ever impress / The light sand which paves it-Consciousness." What hidden romantic current, after all, washes a Lucy poem onto Knapp 54 The full significance of such romantic vignettes set within New Pragmatist discourse only comes to view when we peruse the broad wash effects of romanticism in an extended corpus of cultural criticism such as Richard Rorty's (and, in the background, John Dewey's and William James's). 55 There are Rorty's direct quotations and allusions, for example: "something far more deeply interfused," "murder to dissect," "negative capability," "clerisy of the nation," "create the taste by which he will be judged," "I must Create a System, or be enslav'd by another Man's," and so forth.56 (Dewey: "The 'magic' of poetry-and pregnant experience has poetical quality-is precisely the revelation of meaning in the old effected by its presentation through the new. It radiates the light that never was on land and sea"; James: "As Wordsworth says, 'thought is not; in enjoyment it expires.' ")57 And there is Rorty's consistent use of "romantic" as a period concept designed at once to instruct philosophy in the imaginative groundlessness of romantic world making and to criticize the too idealist goal of the original romantic world makers. Particularly dependent upon the romantic period concept are essays such as "Professionalized Philosophy," "Idealism and Textualism," and the "Contingency" series. To make a collage:
survived from the disappearance of metaphysical idealism as a scientific, arguable thesis was, simply, romanticism.... Romanticism was aufgehoben in pragmatism.... The important philosophers of our own century are those who have tried to follow through on the Romantic poets. 58 It is not coincidental that one of Rorty's latest heroes of "postphilosophical" culture is Harold Bloom.59 Romanticism is Rorty's archetype for a universe in which the ground is stable only between world-expunging and world-making swerves.
Finally, I invoke just one other side of high postmodern cultural criticism: French postmodern/pragmatist theory as represented, for example, by Lyotard's
The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. 60 The Differend is emphatically a work of cultural criticism not only because it draws its semiotics from the "pragmatics" tradition launched by C. S. Peirce, G. H. Mead, and Charles Morris61 but because it sets its finally postsemiotic world of splintered phrase universes on a primal scene of (post)culture: Auschwitz. Auschwitz-and, since this remains an ineluctably French work, secondarily the terror of the French Revolution-is where old philosophers come to dispute their final truth-solutions: epistemological, metaphysical, even syntactical "realities." Is there a speakable and verifiable truth communicable between phrase universes? How can there be such "linkage" if some final solutions silence an entire class of speakers, an entire testament of phrases?
In truth, did the Final Solution, did Auschwitz really happen?62 Philosophers come to offer their judgments. And two of the philosophers who walk most largely are Kant and Hegel. Tutelary geniuses of some of Lyotard's most sustained "Notices," Kant and Hegel are the bookends of Enlightenment and romanticism between which the "differend" is the book burning. The differend is a "feeling" for the unspeakability of any Truth about final solutions, a noncognitive reaching after unspeakable words, a silent grasping for... As Lyotard says immediately after his third Kant Notice: "Is this the sense in which we are not modern? Incommensurability, heterogeneity, the differend, the persistence of proper names, the absence of a supreme tribunal? Or, on the other hand, is this the continuation of romanticism, the nostalgia that accompanies the retreat of .. . etc.?" (Lyotard's elision). 63 More such fragments of romanticism could be gathered. Cultural criticism's pragmatics of "everyday" or "ordinary" "experience," for example, is in part certifiably romantic. So, too, there is romanticism in the dialogics of cultural criticism: the view that culture is no more than a series of conversational improvisations, stories, or petits recits. The ordinary and the storied, after all, is the heartland of Lyrical Ballads. But perhaps our fragments already limn the whole. To view cultural-critical atomism in historical perspective is to discover precisely what I earlier called an iconic metaphorics, or, to use the romantic rather than modernist concept, the symbol. As Coleridge might phrase it, cultural-critical "detail" is the part through which the whole shines translucently.64 Thus listen again to the unmistakable allusions in our matrix: "minute particulars," "grains of sand in 90 
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Cultural criticism remembers the process of micro-world making by which children sporting upon the shore, the boy in the boat, the gibbet mast, and so on once created phenomenally entire universes within the local or regional. I underscore here an aspect of high cultural criticism so sustained and colorful that in all likelihood it will be the method's most anthologized element, its "best" work. Cultural criticism's best is its passion for constructing micro-worlds each as intricately detailed, yet also as expansive in mythic possibility, as a Wordsworthian Lakeland, Blakean ordered space, Keatsian Grecian Urn, or-to cite a modern but deeply romantic analogue-Faulkner's Yoknapatawpha County. When we sift the richly worked anecdotes of the New Historicism (e.g., any of Greenblatt's or Steven Mullaney's inaugural paradigms); when we caress the even more lovingly reconstructed micro-worlds of the New Cultural History (the universes of heretic millers, false Martin Guerres, cat-killing apprentices, or Le Roy Ladurie's Pays d'Oc); when we regard the intricately meditated Cashinahua "Notice" and other vignettes of philosophy-as-life in Lyotard's Differend; and when we enjoy New Pragmatism's comically inventive alternate universes done up in analyticphilosophy fashion (worlds in which poems wash up on beaches complete with submarines in the distance, Rorty's neo-Swiftian society of Antipodeans)65-in sum, when we read any of these miraculously sustained bubbles of recreated or created context, we are for a moment again a child shaking one of those globed, water-filled landscapes filled with miniature snowflakes. The flakes of detail fall into place, and we are charmed by both their slow suspense and the crystal clarity of the scene when all has settled into mock reality. Or to magnify the miniature: this is what Jean Baudrillard calls "our only architecture today: great screens on which are reflected atoms, particles, molecules in motion. Not a public scene or true public space but gigantic spaces of circulation, ventilation, and ephemeral connections. "66 In the picture of great detail, in sum, the local threatens to go transcendental: detailism becomes what Baudrillard calls "molecular transcendence," the "idealism of the molecule."67 Cultural critics, we note, recognize this witching moment of local transcendence in their works. In some of their most meditative passages, they pause on the threshold of transcendence aware that Keatsian magic casements of detail are about to open on a foam of perilous seas, in faery lands forlorn. In this moment ("Forlorn! the very word is like a bell/To toll [them] back . . ."), they become critics of cultural criticism. Only so does their critical sense survive, in a self-reflexive rather than social gaze. Leah Marcus thus observes reflexively in the epilogue to her fine book on topical or local reading: "The Local Transcendence 91 project for localization sets itself resolutely against the general and the universal, but has its own ways of creating generalities, leaping over difference in order to construct an alternative order of 'essences' out of the materials of history"; and again, "Generating a plenitude of particulars is not the same as appealing to a realm of ultimate truths, yet there may be important ways in which the two activities are functionally similar."68 Stephen Greenblatt inquires, But what if we refuse the lure of a totalizing vision? The alternative frequently proposed is a relativism that refuses to privilege one narrative over another, that celebrates the uniqueness of each cultural moment. But this stance-akin to congratulating both the real and the pretended Martin Guerre for their superb performances-is not, I think, either promising or realistic. For thorough-going relativism has a curious resemblance to the universalizing that it proposes to displace.9
Foucault adds: "Is it not perhaps the case that these fragments of genealogies are no sooner brought to light.. than they run the risk of re-codification, re- Now we can take a page from Naomi Schor's Reading in Detail. The "threshold" of transcendence on which high cultural criticism pauses is the sublime. In a series of chapters tracing the tradition of detailism from Sir Joshua Reynolds through Hegel, Freud, Barthes (and others), Schor comes to the crucial insight that detailism overthrew neoclassical generalization to dominate in the age of romanticism and the realistic novel only because it was made subservient to the aesthetics of sublimity.72 The spot-of-time detail was a help (and, in Schor's gender argument, helpmeet) to transcendence. It is our own modernist and poststructuralist age, she argues, that at last "desublimates" the "detail ideal."73 Addressed specifically to the postmodern, my own argument diverges in a direction suggested by Lyotard's "What Is Postmodernism?" Lyotard argues: "Modern aesthetics is an aesthetic of the sublime, though a nostalgic one .... The postmodern would be that which, in the modern . And with this copular is we at last come to the Real. The Real in cultural criticism is indistinguishable from figure. How else could we understand what is by what is not except by synecdoche, metaphor, or symbol so extreme that it is catachresis? To change our own figure from perilous seas to high sierras: when we face the massif of detail piled up by high cultural criticism, we at last truly climb mountains. We end on some cloud-wrapped Snowdon or nimbusnoumenon where any visible detail-say the way a rift in the clouds sublimes all the underlying voices of the world-marks the threshold of the visionary.77 The visionary "is" the Real.
Or perhaps "visionary" and "transcendental" are too otherworldly to map cultural criticism, which, while it eschews foundational ground, makes its home not in the abyss of seas or the inverted abyss of mountains (the two sublime bounds of Braudel's precedent-setting work of detailism, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World) but on the firm terra cognita of the great coastal plains Modern life involves the deification of the here and the now; of the specific, the particular, the unique, that which happens once and has no measure of value save such as it brings with itself. Such deification is monstrous fetishism, unless the deity be there; unless the universal lives, moves, and has its being in experience as individualized.78
To complete this picture of great detail, we need now only rename the "atom" so as to restore the discourse of scientism and immanence to the sphere of culture proper. Other names in high cultural criticism for the atom are "individual" and "community"-the progressively enlarged horizons of local detail.
What is the "subject," that vexed unit of identity in cultural criticism? In one view, the subject is the immanental individual: the "individual" who fends off totalism in de Certeau's The Practice of Everyday Life and that Lentricchia in his "The Return of William James" calls "the particular, the local, the secret self," the "isolatos ... at the frontier. All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms detailism is in part a sustained allegory for individualism: when we subscribe to "the concrete, the material, and the particular" or "the particular and particularly constrained," we are really rewriting the biography of what old-line Marxism made taboo: individualities behaving with all the relative autonomy of "real" people in the ideal Western democracy. People, as it were, are personified details. The highest stakes involved in mapping the atomistic detail over the individual then appear if we enlarge our horizons to "community." Here I refer to what may be the single most promising, if also problematic, front of cultural criticism: its exploration of the communally "parochial," "local," and "regional."
These latter terms, which criss-cross our matrix, herald worlds of research.80 Leah Marcus's and Richard Helgerson's works about localism, for instance; Bourdieu's project of habitus; or Geertz's essays on local knowledge focus "localism" as the underexplored zone between the discretely individual and the massively collective. But localism is assuredly also problematic. We can witness such phrases from our matrix as "the experience of particular communities," "individual autonomy . . . communal autonomy," "a reader situated in a particular social space," or "daily life in a particular community." By defining hyperdiscrete communities that behave as if they were particular individuals, these phrases indicate what sometimes seems a too resistless mapping of the person-concept over localism.8' The regional community functions as if it were a solidarity of one, as if, in other words, it were immanent with identity.
Perhaps the boldest in this regard is the branch of high postmodern cultural criticism that has made the most of the local community concept for theoretical (or, rather, "anti"-theoretical) purposes: New Pragmatism. Whether we consider Rorty's idolization of local context-especially his recent aggrandizement of the "liberal community"-or Fish's "interpretive communities," "we" (using the pronoun enactively here) sense what is perhaps an entirely too comfortable sense of solidarity signed by the heavy-handed pronouns of the method: characteristically, "we" and "us" versus "they" and "them" (sometimes "I" and "me" versus "you"). Witness the following statement by Rorty:
The point of these examples is that our sense of solidarity is strongest when those with whom solidarity is expressed are thought of as "one of us," where "us" means something smaller and more local than the human race. That is why "because she is a human being" is a weak, unconvincing explanation of a generous action [emphasis mine].82
What seemingly universal solidarity authorizes the our (outside quote marks) that, in a secondary operation, then thinks about the smaller and more local "us" or "she" (the latter inside quote marks)?83 Or again, from Fish:
The only "proof" of membership is fellowship, the nod of recognition from someone in the same community, someone who says to you what neither of us could ever prove to a All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms third party: "we know." I say it to you now, knowing full well that you will agree with me (that is, understand) only if you already agree with me.84
My question to you: Who is the generalizable I or me here in this solidaristic "we"-community of "I's"? Is Fish (or anyone), after all, always the same? The problem of change aside, even the most instantiated context for a community of fellowship-to take my own case: a lecture hall in which a professor of romanticism answers questions about this paper before an audience of professors and graduate students-poses a problem of infinite regress in the determination of the "I." For what is the protocol that confers membership upon the speaker-in-thiscommunity such that the various competing aspects of his relevant identity (e.g., Teacher, Student, Specialist, Generalist, Administrator in charge of telling some graduate students they do not belong in the professional community) agree to speak as a proper "member," a suitably consistent "I"? The heart of the problem, of course, is that there are very few contexts of interest in which the local community provides enough external signals ("nods" from the audience) to govern the relationship of a self's "selves" without uncertainty or anxiety. It would thus seem that the "I" that gestures its membership in Fish's interpretive community requires for its constitution the supplement of an internal interpretive community-a mental scene in which its "selves" nod to each other in a fellowship governed by an imagined or memorial context. Of course, to take the regress much further (what, after all, defines each of the self's interior selves?) would stretch this kind of analysis-and perhaps any kind of analysis-beyond what it is designed to do. The main point is that a local-community concept that takes us back only one step of the regress to an elemental "I" void of internal distinction has the felt effect of being immanental, foundational. Tied notionally to an undifferentiated "I," the interpretive community appears to act as if it were itself a person concept.85
In the New Pragmatism, in sum, and to varying degrees in all the cultural criticisms, there resides a deeply troubled Us-versus-Them problem that is not resolved by the bare recognition that the interpretive community of Us does confront Them. The very denomination or pronomination of an Us (and "I") by which to make statements about Us and Them is the blindness of cultural criticism's insight. It leaves in darkness all that is truly of moment about the Us-versusThem, self-versus-other, problem: the procedures of emigration/immigration, border inspection/recognition, confrontation/negotiation, and ultimately terror/ desire creating an Us from Them. What assures "us," after all, that the local, regional, or parochial community we study is a community-or collective "unity" -in the first place?86 Nothing but a direct mapping of the isolatos concept over community (in a spirit directly contrary to Lentricchia's intention in "The Return of William James" to challenge imperialist appropriations of world identity). And
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The detail, we might say, is as small as Napoleon.
Release 2.0
The mistress gave the order, enjoining the boys above all to avoid frightening her grise.
Gleefully Jerome and Leveille set to work, aided by the journeymen. Armed with broom handles, bars of the press, and other tools of their trade, they went after every cat they could find, beginning with la grise. Leveille smashed its spine with an iron bar and
Jeromefinished it off. Then they stashed it in a gutter while the journeymen drove the other cats across the rooftops, bludgeoning every one within reach and trapping those who tried to escape in strategically placed sacks .... Roused by gales of laughter, the mistress arrived. She let out a shriek as soon as she saw a bloody cat dangling from a noose. Then she realized it might be la grise. Certainly not, the men assured her: they had too much respect for the house to do such a thing.
- There is also the rhetoric of commitment to detail. Commitment is not neutral attachment to "reality" but partisanal attachment to one side or the other in the existential combat, the essential binarism, of culture-of culture, that is, conceived as local Us versus Them and, within any Us, as less versus more powerful subcultures.90 Or more fully, since not all cultural critics express political sympathy with one side or the other: high postmodern cultural criticism is committed to the antitotalistic vision of culture as the "or" or "versus" of struggle itself. For high cultural critics, that is, culture is a tragedy, an eternal agon. Details are the supporting cast. The bodies of detail-Darnton's cats among them-pile up in the theater of catfights, cockfights, treason trials, executions, razings, plagues, rebellions, revolutions, Terrors, and so on. Yet however high the pile, such details evidencing the agony of the dominated-versus-the-dominating remain strangely faceless, anonymous. They are never more than throwaway markers, represenLocal Transcendence 97 tations, "symbols" of a contest enacted in the name of detail but greater than any particular detail. While high cultural critics may commit themselves to an agonist in the contest, in sum, the very facility with which they process interchangeable details argues their greater commitment to "struggle," "resistance," "opposition," "subversion," "transgression" as abstract, perfect forms of contest.
The logic that issues from such commitment to the idea of contest is "practice." Increasingly heard in high cultural criticism across all its denominations, practice is the analytic of culture as digital rather than atomic-as a field of zero versus one, dominated versus dominating. According to this logic, cultural contestants are essentially "bits," and the function of bit-people is to enact through myriad "micro-tactics" and "-techniques" of resistance what de Certeau calls "the practice of everyday life" and what Foucault, gazing reciprocally upon repression, calls the practice of "power."
A question for high cultural criticism: What is the common denominator of "practice" as spoken on both sides of the Atlantic and across the political spectrum that makes the details of practice at once so fulsome and faceless? Why does the very word practice at times seem so overdetermined-so overstrong, repetitive, and at last ritualistic that it threatens to become compulsory? And in our post-or against-theory ambience, is there such a thing as a "resistance to practice" akin to resistance to theory?
A further question that an extended version of this essay would need to ask: What about that moment of remove when the critic views the perfect form of cultural agony as if from across the proscenium? How is it that the detailed and practical battles of culture can finally seem as distantiated as little, regional wars glimpsed on the television screen or in a computer war game? If postmodern culture is agonic, in short, it is also ironic and aesthetic: commitment to a staged scene of resistance lasts until the show is over and the critic touches the control to bring up the next riveting petit recit on the cable. The rhetoric of commitment ends in the rhetoric of detachment. And the logic that this latter, ironic rhetoric makes possible is dialogism: the view that every set of cultural practices is finally just the outcome of a local "vocabulary," "perspective," or "simulation" whose conversational improvisations, little stories, "spatial stories," styles, and so on make culture-from the view of the ironist rather than those trapped in the simulation-all a detachable facade.9' High cultural criticism, we may say vulgarly, is a culture-spiel as determinedly depthless in its play with representational surfaces, facades, screens, and media of all sorts as a vinyl LP hand spun by a rap artist, that master of culture-spiel able to fragment long-play metanarrative into petits recits.
Cybernetic, televisionary, rhapsodic: such models of mediated and detached cultural experience could be multiplied. The array of surfaces that is the cultural matrix grows thick all about us, and it comforts more than disturbs. Once we insulated ourselves from reality in universals and totalisms. Now we wrap our- , 1990 ), 33-34, 279. 7. The larger project for which this essay prepares will consider some of these alternatives to high postmodern cultural criticism (I choose the term high postmodern by analogy with high modernist or high romantic). Gender, ethnic, area (including postcolonial), and cultural-materialist cultural criticisms, of course, can overlap with high postmodern sorts-thus, for example, the relation between cultural-materialist "conjuncturalism" and the contextualist "detailism" I will come to. But there is a palpable difference: the degree to which the alternative cultural criticisms speak from, to, for, or in the midst of discrete population bases. In this regard, Rorty's "liberal community" and other such high postmodern "interpretive communities" may be "specific," "local," and "parochial" in principle; but they are clearly "meta-" by comparison with the countercultural youth, biker, and other "subcultures," for example, that were the
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This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 09 Jun 2016 04:57:46 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms early stomping ground of conjuncturalist research in the 1970s. It would be unwarranted, however, to exaggerate the divergence between high and alternative cultural critics. A fairer statement would be that each individual postmodern cultural critic, precisely to the extent of his or her postmodernity, moves between high and alternative, generalist and population-dedicated, modes. 8. I should emphasize that my priority in this essay is scope: I show the similarity of contextualist discourse among many authors who in other ways are strikingly disparate. The reason that close readings in difference must be secondary here is not only limitation of space but the complicity of any streaks-in-the-tulip approach with the rhetoric of detailism that is my topic. Focus on similarity, that is, is critical in function. The first task of any criticism of high cultural criticism must be to suspend the postmodern dogma of difference in order to see it from a new angle. I say "suspend," of course, because difference-as deconstruction teaches-inevitably catches up with discourses of similarity. But there is something to be learned in not too quickly allowing our criticism to coalesce with its topic in a common discourse of difference, differance, and brood of similar grid-words recited so often that they acquire a fetishistic quality.
Indeed, an analysis of "grid fetish" from the perspective of feminism or of the history of sexuality would need to address the psychosocial dimensions of "matrix" worship.
(Michel Foucault's The History of Sexuality is itself replete with the vocabulary of "matrices," "grids," "networks," "arrays," and "manifolds.") Phrased ontologically rather than sexually, "matrix" is what postmodern cultural criticism now has instead of "matter" (both words, of course, born of the same "mother"). Though still instinctively empirical, as I go on to argue, cultural criticism has learned to merge materialism with the purely informatic (and/or "ideological") by detaching "matter" from any premise of absolute, physical ground. Matter is now a "structure" akin to transistor circuitry etched upon silicon-i.e., a pattern independent of the substratum that carries it. Rendered essenceless, the substratum becomes not a ground at all but-and this is a concept that complements "matrix" in postmodernism-the medium. The media is the universe of depthless, essenceless, pure surfaces (screens, displays, facades) upon which "matrices" play out their "representations" of matter. 15. This matrix is culled from a larger database that I will at times draw upon to supplement my discussion below. 22. The deep influences (or perhaps, confluences) upon my discussion of "rhetoric" of detail in this essay include de Man, Barthes on the reality effect, Baudrillard on hyperreality and simulation, and Lyotard on phrase universes. An interesting thought experiment, for example, would be to read de Man together with Barthes's discussion in "The Reality Effect" of "rhetoric" and reality's "resistance to meaning" (14). So, too, Baudrillard on "the rhetoric of the real," "hyperreality," and "simulations" could be read in proximity both to de Man and to Barthes (for the phrase "rhetoric of the real," see "Structural Law of Value," 70). The notion of simulation, for instance, resonates against that of "imposition" in Paul de Man, "Shelley Disfigured," in Deconstruction and Criticism, ed. Harold Bloom et al. (New York, 1979) , esp. 63-64, as well as against the idea of imitating "what is already the simulation of an essence" in Barthes's "Reality Effect" (13). Finally, Lyotard on "phrase universes," on the contingent "linking" of phrases, and on the "name" that can link only because it is an "empty and constant designator" would make a fitting reprise of the themes of rhetoric, imposition, and simulation, respectively (on the name as empty and constant designator, see The Differend, 44). Lyotard's vision of phrase universes, we may say, amplifies the "reality effect" into a "universe effect."
23. On "elsewhereness," see Liu, Wordsworth, 5, 467, 497, and passim. 24. I refer especially to the last two sections of Geertz's essay and to the chapters on Vladimir Nabokov and George Orwell in the last part of Rorty's book. A passage such as the following in the introduction to Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity epitomizes the linear trajectory I indicate: "This process of coming to see other human beings as 'one of us' rather than as 'them' is a matter of detailed description of what unfamiliar people are like.... This is a task not for theory but for genres such as ethnography, the journalist's report, the comic book, the docudrama, and, especially, the novel" (xvi Such amnesia is symptomatic of postmodernism at large, which characteristically attempts to find its identity by asking the claustrophobic, historically foreshortened question "Is postmodernism continuous or discontinuous with modernism?" 27. I am simplifying, obviously, on several fronts. Most basically, a sufficient mapping of the intellectual history of cultural criticism would need to be nonlinear. A particularly vexed instance is the complex, multilinear modernist moment. Take the case of early twentieth-century American pragmatism: not only would the relation of such pragmatism to the aesthetics, formalism, "history of ideas," Marxism, and other aspects of the modern moment need further thought, but so too would the relation of such pragmatism to its own nineteenth-century or turn-of-the-century precedents and to nineteenth-century historicism. Or to enter the problem through the alternative gateway of New Criticism: one of the great underexplored connections in intellectual history is the link of similarity/difference between New Criticism and the American pragmatic tradition. With its worry over the "use" of poetry, its hands-on praxis of close reading, its "ambiguous" understanding of literature as fluid experience, and its very style of argumentative (and often polemical) discourse, classical New Criticism at times bears an uncanny resemblance to classical pragmatism. In short, each historical "moment" in my fiction of intellectual history is criss-crossed in synchronic and temporal directions by multiple links with other developments. 28. This essay is conceived as part of a larger work on postmodern cultural criticism. In presenting it here, I have tried to make it as self-sufficient as possible, but my thesis requires that I at times look beyond the moment of immanence in high cultural criticism to the further moments of "commitment" and "detachment" that complete the overall experience I have dubbed "detached immanence." 29. Louis O. Mink, "Change and Causality in the History of Ideas," Eighteenth-Century Studies 2 (1968): 7-25. 30. As I suggest in note 14 above, the matrix form is also finally a hollowing out of "matter." Matrixes in cultural criticism (my overall project will show) are at last undecidable: at once full of matter and outside matter. They are a kind of hyperspace. A fuller consideration of "Against Theory" could usefully set its "intention" or "squiggles in the sand versus meaning" issue side-by-side with analogous ghost-in-themachine problems in Knapp's and Michaels's other work. Most germane is Michaels's own cultural-critical book: the New Pragmatist/New Historicist Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism: American Literature at the Turn of the Century (Berkeley, 1987) . Here, Michaels discusses much the same squiggles in sand versus meaning problem (more generally: "material and representation, hard money and soft, beast and soul"; 173) under the topics of commodity value, money, corporations, bodies versus persons, automatic writing, gambling, and photography. However, the historicist medium in which Michaels's book embeds the problem makes a qualitative difference in the felt outcome of the discussion. "Against Theory" reductively collapses together the binary terms of the ghost/machine controversy to leave us in pragmatism's characteristically flat, leveled world: in its view, to see a meaningful text in squiggles in the sand just is to see a ghost of authorial intention, otherwise we would not see a "text" in the first place. Or as Knapp and Michaels put it flatly, "We have argued that what a text means and what its author intends it to mean are identical and that their identity robs intention of any theoretical interest" (19). But The Gold Standard delays the collapse of the terms, allowing them to interfere, reverse, and complicate each other in an "antithetical" fashion (for "antithetical," see p. 173).
"Delay," indeed, could here be elevated into a critical concept. It might be said that the contribution of New Historicism to New Pragmatism, otherwise uncannily alike in their assumptions, is precisely to introduce a salutary delay. (Both methods, of course, have their homologue in deconstruction with its "deferral.") Delayed by the necessity of finding, reading, revising, and being fair to historical examples with all their messy imprecision (as opposed to the "pure" philosophical examples I mention below), the doctrine of antitranscendence and local belief encounters a resistance it is forced to internalize. In the process, it becomes more truly interesting.
Logical analysis in "Against Theory," we observe, habitually occurs along a hypothetical temporal axis: "In one moment he identifies meaning and intended meaning; in the next moment he splits them apart"; "Hirsch is imagining a moment of interpretation before intention is present"; "Intention ... must be present from the start"; "The moment of imagining intentionless meaning constitutes the theoretical moment itself"; "One might ask whether the question of intention still seems as irrelevant as it did seconds before" (13-16). And the use of catching the essay's many antagonists in an inconsistency framed by the delay between one thought-"moment" (or even "second") and another, of course, is to prove a "mistake" (one of the essay's key words, e.g., pp. 12-14, 18, 22, 23). The general argument of "Against Theory" is that any temporal break interposed between always-already identical concepts is fallacious (the spatial version of this argument is the vaunted New Pragmatist distinction between being "in" one's context of belief and being transcendentally "outside" it).
The Gold Standard, however, has to locate the delay of fallacy in more-or-less thickly
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This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Thu, 09 Jun 2016 04:57:46 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms described contexts of historical controversy and fiction. The following, for example, is essentially a temporal analysis realized in a particular milieu: "The subject of naturalism ... is typically unable to keep his beliefs lined up with his interests for more than two or three pages at a time." (177). As a result, the delay of fallacy is embedded in historical time, and finding a slip between one instant in an author's text and another leads not to the shrill "aha!" tone of "Against Theory" but to the bass chord of historical understanding. Witness, for example, the cherish with which Michaels treats the "mistakes" of naturalism:
But can economies be subjects? Can they have intentions, desires, beliefs? Can they have interests? . . . From [a certain] standpoint, the ascription of interests to a money economy ... is only a figure of speech or a mistake... At the same time, however, as literary critics-and as critics in particular of naturalism-we can hardly dismiss this mistake, this particular figure, as merely one among others. For according to the logic of naturalism it is only because we are fascinated by such mistakes-by natural objects that look as if they were made by humans-that we have any economy at all. The foundation of our economy, the primitive desire to own, is nothing but our response to these mistakes, our desire to own the mistakes themselves. (178-79; see also p. 171 for a complicated treatment of "mistakes")
Mistakes such as these are part of history (and of our participation in history), and history-given the pragmatist respect for contingency-is not as easily dismissed as "theory." According to the overall argumentative paradigm of The Gold Standard, therefore, the use of discovering "mistakes" in history is not to prove or disprove fallacy but to "exemplify" a historical "network of related contradictions and controversies" (174-75): the authors that Michaels discusses "exemplify" the logical tensions of naturalism in all its literary, intellectual, economic, and social complexity (see also p. 27 on exemplification). (whether in the work of Austin and Searle or its parallels in the later Wittgenstein). It may be speculated that it was Austin's scrupulously detailed attention to language coupled with his basic enterprise of describing language as usage (as opposed to the Carnapian task of analyzing language as logical truth-statement) that provided the perfect filter through which original pragmatism could pass to the New Pragmatism. 48. Knapp and Michaels, "Against Theory," 15. The full example runs to p. 17.
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